Robustness Tests A: Definition of Regime Supporters and Opponents
A central argument of the paper is that Russian citizens have different kinds of political knowledge and different ways of processing political information depending upon differences in their political orientation. In the paper, political orientation is defined in terms of either vote or voting intention in the Presidential election of March 2012. Supporters made up 26 percent of our sample and opponents 21 percent. In the presidential election of 2012 Putin polled 64 percent and Ziuganov and Prokhorov 25 percent combined. These results were in line with national surveys in the month before the election in which support for Putin ranged from 59 percent to 66 percent and from 14 to 19 percent for the two opposition candidates. Thus our sample has somewhat more opponents of the regime and many fewer supporters than the population as a whole. However, as I demonstrate in this part of the Appendix, the basic results of the paper are not sensitive to this definition. I vary the definition in two ways. First, I show that the results are similar if one defines regime supporters and opponents in terms of vote in the Duma elections of December 2011, rather than the presidential election. Second, I show that change the definition of regime supporter and opponents in the presidential election, makes little difference to the results. As the following tables show, changing the approach to defining regime supporters and opponents produces the same results. Table A1 presents the correlates of knowledge of Golos using different definitions of regime supporters and opponents. Table shows odds-ratios with z-statistics in parentheses. In Model 1 of Table  A1 , voters show more knowledge of Golos than non-voters, while opponents (both liberal voters and KPRF voters) show more knowledge than voters for the ruling United Russia Party. Liberal voters are defined as those who voted for either Yabloko or Right Cause. These findings are precisely in line with the results based on presidential voting. In Model 2, I use the presidential vote intention/vote definition, but narrow the conception of regime supporters to include only Putin voters. This also broadens the definition of non-voters to include supporters of regime-backed candidates such as Sergei Mironov and Vladimir Zhirinovsky. The results are essentially the same as with the broader definition of regime vote, though since this definition introduces more noise (by including politically active voters in the non-voter category) the standard errors are inflated and the results for Putin and Prokhorov voters are only marginally significant. Table shows odds-ratios with z-statistics in parentheses.
In Table A2 , I present the results of looking at the correlates of a perception of Duma fraud using different definitions of regime supporters and opponents. Table A2 shows the results using definitions based on Duma party vote choice and Putin voters only. The hypothesis here, to recap, is that only regime opponents will use knowledge of Golos to inform their perspective on whether or not there was fraud in the elections. Other citizens' views of fraud will be unaffected by knowledge of Golos. Table A2 presents evidence that supports this general contention. The table shows odds-ratios with z-statistics in parentheses Models 1-5 look at the effect of knowledge of Golos on opinions about Duma fraud taking United Russia voters (model 1), opposition voters (KPRF and liberal party voters -model 2), people who voted for other Duma parties (model 3), non-voters (model 4) and Putin voters (as opposed to regime voters defined in the paper -model 5) respectively. In each of the 5 cases, only opposition voters show evidence of being influenced by their knowledge of Golos in making assessments of the fairness or otherwise of the Duma elections. In models 6-10, I add in the media variables used in Table 2 in the paper. Using the definition of regime voter in the main paper, the opposition voter results were robust to including all the media controls. Using definitions based on Duma voting patterns, the effects for opposition voters are still positive and in the opposite direction from United Russia voters (model 6) but collinearity between knowledge of Golos and media use choices drives down the statistical significance (model 7). Table shows odds-ratios with z-statistics in parentheses.
Robustness Tests B: Defining Knowledge of Election Observers
In this section, I show that the main regression results in the paper are robust to a different and broader definition of knowledge of election observers. In the main body of the paper, I define knowledge of election observers as the ability to correctly identify what Golos does from a list of plausible alternatives. Respondents were first asked if they had heard of Golos. Those who said they had (41 percent) were then asked which if the following activities Golos was involved with --election monitoring, minority rights in Russia, rights of Russians abroad or ecological projects. Some 54 percent of respondents answered correctly, giving 21 percent of all respondents who could correctly identify Golos. In this section I base knowledge on the response to the question: "Have you heard of the Map of Violations?" This was a map showing numbers and places of electoral violations reported to Golos. The Map was published in the popular opposition website gazeta.ru. Using this definition produces a much larger proportion of citizens who know Golos -39 percent. 
C. Robustness Checks: Experimental Treatments
In this section, I show that the precise definition of regime supporters, opponents and non-voters does not alter the basic results of the experimental section.
C1. Duma Definition of Supporters and Opponents
In the first part of the appendix I show the experimental results using Duma vote instead of presidential vote as the key criterion defining supporters, opponents and non-voters. Supporters are defined as respondents who reported voting for United Russia (UR). Opponents are those who voted either for the KPRF or for one of the liberal opposition parties (Yabloko or Union of Right Forces). People who did not vote for any of the Duma parties are defined as non-voters. The results are slightly different in details from the results using the presidential definition, but they show strong effects of motivated reasoning in the same kinds of ways as before. Here it seems that UR voters are actually more committed and more skeptical of observers and respond more negatively to Golos and OSCE frames than voters for regime candidates in the presidential election. Since UR voters are a smaller group, more committed group contained almost entirely within Putin (and so regime) voters, the difference is not surprising.
Golos Treatment
The results of the Golos treatment are particularly interesting using the Duma vote definition. While proregime voters in the presidential definition were unmoved by the Golos treatment (as hypothesized), UR voters were actually less trusting of observers after hearing the frame, though the effect is not statistically significant. Regime opponents were more trusting (p=.1 one-tailed), which is a better result from the perspective of the theory than in the main paper. As in the main paper, non-voters were more trusting after hearing the Golos frame using this definition (p=0.08 two-tailed). 
United Russia Voters -Two-sample t test with equal variances

C1. Duma Definition of Supporters and Opponents
OSCE Treatment
Using the Duma definition of political orientation also shows marked differences in the processing of political information with the OSCE treatment. Here United Russia voters were actually more skeptical of the OSCE responding negatively to the treatment (p=.05 two-tailed), while the effect on opponents is of the right sign but less significant than in the main paper (p=.15 one-tailed). Non-voters are unmoved, as in the main paper. 
United Russia Voters -Two-sample t test with equal variances
C1. Duma Definition of Supporters and Opponents
US Agent Treatment
The effects of the US Agent treatment are as hypothesized and, for regime supporters, much larger using the Duma definition. Trust in observers falls .58 among regime supporters (p=.01), while neither regime opponents' nor neutrals' opinions are changed. 
United Russia Voters -Two-sample t test with equal variances
C1. Duma Definition of Supporters and Opponents
NTV Treatment
The results of the NTV treatment again show differences in information processing, but are somewhat different from what we find in the main paper. Here United Russia voters are unmoved by the video clip, a finding that is quite surprising and different from the general tenor of the rest of the findings. As in the main paper, regime opponents and here even non-voters are negatively influenced by this powerful treatment. 
United Russia Voters -Two-sample t test with equal variances
C2. Putin Definition of Supporters and Opponents
In this section, I show the results of the experiments if we limit the definition of regime supporters to being Putin voters, instead of including those who voted for (or intended to vote for) Mironov and Zhirinovsky in the March 2012 presidential election. The effect of this is to add some active voters into the non-voters group, adding noise to the results. Nevertheless, there is still clear evidence of differences in information processing across groups.
For Putin supporters, the results match those in the main paper. Putin supporters are unmoved by the Golos and OSCE frames, but are less trusting of observers when they receive the US agent frame and the NTV video frame. The results for opposition voters are unchanged, since the definition of opposition voters is unchanged and so are not shown.
Golos Treatment
Putin Supporters -Two-sample t test with equal variances 
D1. Experimental treatments in Russian
The texts presented to respondents were as follows.
Neutral Treatment
На 4 декабря 2011 года Россия выбирала депутатов Государственной Думы. На 450 кресел в нижней палате парламента претендовали 2999 представителей 7 политических партий: результаты определяли почти 110 млн человек в России и за рубежом. Обработка первых результатов выборов показала: все партии, представленные в Думе предыдущего созыва, остались и в нижней палате.
Golos Treatment
Наблюдатели от Ассоциации «ГОЛОСа» критикуют выборы в Думу. Наблюдатели объявили о многочисленных нарушениях во время выборов в Госдуму, а также о вмешательстве властей в ход голосования. «Был целый ряд нарушений, когда сама процедура подсчета голосов нарушалась, и был целый ряд фактов серьезных вбросов бюллетеней в избирательные урны, с более чем одной трети избирательных участков мы не получили копии результатов голосования, и были отчеты о том, что были препятствия работе наших наблюдателей», -сказал представитель «ГОЛОСа» на пресс-конференции в Москве.
Ассоциация некоммерческих организаций «В защиту прав избирателей «ГОЛОС» -российская некоммерческая организация, занимающаяся с 2000 года независимым наблюдением за выборами и защитой прав избирателей. Сегодня Ассоциация работает в 48 регионах России.
GosDep Treatment
Cтало известно, что ассоциация "Голос" имеет тесные связи с Госдепом США. Oказались новые документы, подтверждающие что контакты "Голоса" с американскими дипломатами касались не только "моральной поддержки", Американская дипмиссия дала детальную инструкцию по действиям наблюдателей на выборах, отвечающим политическим интересам США. Естественно, что за свое сотрудничество с Госдепом США ассоциация "Голос" получала деньги от американцев.
OSCE Treatment
Международные наблюдатели ОБСЕ критикуют выборы в Думу. Наблюдатели объявили о многочисленных нарушениях во время выборов в Госдуму, а также о вмешательстве властей в ход голосования. «Был целый ряд нарушений, когда сама процедура подсчета голосов нарушалась, и был целый ряд фактов серьезных вбросов бюллетеней в избирательные урны, с более чем одной трети избирательных участков мы не получили копии результатов голосования, и были отчеты о том, что были препятствия работе наших наблюдателей», -сказал представитель ОБСЕ на пресс-конференции в Москве.
ОБСЕ является одной из ведущих международны организаций в области наблюдения за выборами. Это ведет, связанные с выборами деятельности в рамках 56 государств-участников, включая техническую помощь и миссии по наблюдению за выборами.
D2. Transcript of Video Clip
Original video is available at: http://www.ntv.ru/peredacha/proisschestvie/archive/i91256. Respondents were shown only the introduction with the NTV station logo blurred out. Text marked with * describes the images on screen.
English Translation
Narrator: "Vote for Russia! Vote against everyone!" Policemen found four thousands leaflets with this slogan in the Barnaul office of the Golos association.
*Police in the Golos office. Snapshots of Leaflets.
Member of the Golos association: "The leaflets you are talking about, the ones that were taken, were on this desk here. We give this desk to volunteers". Narrator: It would be fine, but the leaflets were found in the place where they should not have been on any account, as the Golos association is the association of independent observers. Grigory Melkonyants (deputy director of the Golos association): We have been working for almost 12 years now.
Narrator: And they know very well that they don't have the right to campaign for opposition groups, propagate, ruin ballots and boycott the elections. A question arises -how did the allegedly independent observers acquire the leaflets of radical opposition? * Pictures from the Golos archive. NTV journalists in the Golos office.
Lilia Shibanova (director of the Golos association): I cannot prevent my coordinators from being friends with people from «Solidarnost» or other parties. You see, these people are… ideologically close to us, I'd say.
Narrator: The observers don't really hide the fact that they are ideologically close to certain opposition parties. Neither do they try to conceal their source of funding. Рассказчик: «Кому выгодны заявления о нелигитимности еще несостоявшихся выборов? И как получить пять миллионов долларов за один только голос? Секретные документы иностранных посольств и тайная бухгалтерия профессиональных наблюдателей сегодня в нашей программе. *Чемодан с деньгами. Таблица Excel с огромными суммами в долларах и фамилиями руководства «Голоса». Respondents were screened by income using the following question:
D3. Sample Descriptive Statistics
For the income screener, respondents were asked, "How would you describe the financial status of your family?" Only respondents who placed themselves 3 or higher on the following scale proceeded to the full questionnaire: "1) not enough money even for food, 2) We can buy food but it would be hard for us to buy clothes, 3) We can buy food and clothes, but it would be hard for us to buy a television, fridge or washing machine, 4) We can buy major household appliances, but would not afford a new car, 5) Our earnings are enough for anything but such expensive things like a dacha or an apartment, 6) No financial difficulties, could buy a dacha or apartment if needed."
D4. How does the Internet sample compare with a nationally representative sample?
In this section I take advantage of a nationally representative poll conducted by the Moscow-based polling organization, Levada Center, before and after the presidential election of March 6, 2011, to compare patterns in the internet survey data with those in the population as a whole. The Levada survey was conducted February 17-29 and March 16 -April 2 (roughly the same time as the internet surveys) and drew on 1401 respondents in each round using a standard multi-state cluster sampling approach.
In terms of the population sampled, the internet survey differs from a nationally representative sample in four main ways. First, the internet sample only covers Moscow, St. Petersburg and large cities with population of over 1 million. This group makes up only 31.8 percent of the national sample. Second, we required respondents to have at least some higher education, limiting ourselves to 32.3 percent of the national sample. Third, we only sampled internet users -a group that made up 59 percent of the national sample. Finally, we required that our respondents have enough money to cover food and necessities. This criterion is harder to translate into the national sample as that survey asked respondents to place themselves in one of 5 specific income categories. If we take only the top 3 income categories (people in households with income over R15 000 per month (about $450), we capture 66.4 percent of the national sample. The top 2 categories, people in households making more than R20 000 per month (about $600) then we cover 35.6 percent of the national survey. Putting all these criteria together 11.3 percent of those in a nationally representative sample also fit the criteria for the internet survey (using the R15 000 cut-off) and 10.8 percent (using the R20 000 cut-off).
Fraud Perceptions In A National Sample
Comparing the data from our internet sample with a national sample conducted around the Presidential election of March 2012 suggests that although overall fraud perceptions were lower in the national sample, the patterns I demonstrated in the internet sample are also likely to be found in the national sample. Although there are some differences in how questions are worded, the enormous differences in fraud perceptions between regime supporters and regime opponents are also clear in the national sample. Table D4 .1 illustrates the overall level of perception of fraud in the 2011 Duma elections in Russia. Fully 36.5 percent of the population thought that fraud was at least substantial, though only 13.9 percent felt that the overall results were affected. This compares with 47 percent of the internet sample who described the elections as "not free and fair" (including don't know and don't want to say). However, patterns of fraud perception even in this less distrustful group reflect strongly the same division between regime supporters and opponents that I demonstrated in the main paper. To show this I coded regime supporters, opponents and others according to the same coding procedure used in the main paper. This gave us a distribution of support that was quite different from the internet sample. In the nationally representative sample 54 percent of respondents were defined as regime supporters, 16 percent as opponents and 29.6 percent as "others". Recall that in the internet sample only 27 percent were supporters, 25 percent were opponents and "others" constituted 47 percent of the sample.
Despite the differences in the overall distribution of political orientations, we see the same marked differences in fraud perceptions by orientation. Only 26 percent of opponents thought that there no or only minor violations in the Duma elections, while more than twice the proportion (57 percent) of regimes supports held that opinion. Others, in this regard looked more like opponents, with 28 percent thinking that there were no or minor violations. The pattern is even clearer if we consider those who thought the violations were large enough to change the results of the election -only 8 percent of supporters and 17 percent of others thought this was the case. Fully 30 percent of opponents thought that violations had changed the result of the elections. 
D5 Recruitment Incentives
Panel members are recruited on-line via a network of banners inviting them to share their opinions but without stating the possibility of earning money. Once registered in the panel members might be chosen at random to answer surveys. Invitations are sent to the respondent's e-mail account. Upon receiving an invitation, respondents follow the link from the message. Participation in the survey brings some points, which can be further transferred to the mobile phone number account or to charity funds, or some other purposes. Each panel member can participate in the survey not more than once in 2 months.
E. Randomization Checks
In order to identify any possible major administrative error in randomizing the allocation of treatments across respondents, Table E1 shows the p-values from chi-squared tests of whether there is statistically significant variation in the in the allocation of given covariates to experimental groups in each of the survey experiments. Table E1 shows the results of chi-squared test for every variable in Table 1 (except Golos Know, since respondents who knew Golos were excluded from the experiments). We would expect 10 percent of the p-values to be significant at the 10 percent level by random chance. The table shows 5 of 64 variables are significant, suggesting that the randomization process was properly administered. Cells report p values from chi-squared tests. Odds Ratios. Z statistics in parentheses. Table F2 shows the results of comparing opposition and regime voters on knowledge of Golos. As mentioned in the main text, these are statistically different for the minimal and demographic models, but not for the fully saturated model. However, it might reasonably be objected that not all knowledge of Golos is equivalent. The nature of the information campaign around the elections meant that there were basically two quite different routes through which citizens could acquire knowledge of Golos -television and the Internet -and each carried quite different messages. Coverage of Golos on television was uniformly negative, as the Russian government tried to brand Golos before the election as a foreign funded organization acting on the instructions of foreign powers. Coverage of Golos on the Internet, by contrast was mixed, including positive stories from independent sources like Gazeta.ru, which partnered with Golos in the run-up to the elections to highlight abuses, and negative stories on pro-Kremlin websites. Consequently, in the tests that follow I look both at overall knowledge of Golos and at effects excluding knowledge acquired through television only. In the main body of the text, I discuss in some detail the relationship between knowledge of Golos and overall assessments of the direction of the country. I note that there is no difference between the mean assessment of the country's direction between supporter who have heard of Golos and those who have not. The same is true for non-voters. For opponents, the mean before the election among those who have heard of Golos was .27 and compared with .32 for those who had not -this difference is substantively very small and not statistically significant (the variable is coded as 1 for the right direction and 0 for the wrong direction). After the election, things had changed somewhat -the mean among those who had not heard of Golos stayed about the same (.33), while among those who had heard of Golos the mean evaluation was .15, a substantial difference that is significant at p<.01. Taken together, it seems clear that knowledge of Golos alone is far from being a good overall measure of the extremeness of the attitude to the regime.
F. Regression Tables Underlying Figures 1 and 2
Moreoever, as Table F4 shows, if we include overall evaluations of the direction of the country in the regressions from Figure 2 of the main table, the effect of knowledge of Golos on opponents is still statistically significant and even substantively a little larger than before. Taken together, these analyses provides strong evidence to suggest that knowledge of Golos itself does have an effect on evaluations of elections for regime opponents but not (as the Table confirms again) for supporters or non-voters. 
